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The Second Amendment and the
Incorporation Conundrum: Towards a
Workable Jurisprudence
by
KOREN WAI WONG-ERVIN*
"A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed."'
Introduction
Despite the large number of United States Supreme Court cases
interpreting the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court has almost entirely
avoided interpreting the Second Amendment. Moreover, since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the Court has
devoted a substantial portion of its time and caseload to deciding the
extent to which the prohibitions of section one encompass the
guarantees found in the Bill of Rights32 These decisions, however,
* J.D. Candidate, 1999; B.S. Santa Clara University. I would like to thank Brannon
Denning, Professor David Levine, Professor Reuel Schiller, and Michael Stonebreaker for
reading numerous drafts and providing many valuable insights. I would also like to thank
Professor David Kopel, Don Kates, Danny Gray, and Professors Ash Bhagwat and Calvin
Massey for their comments on a final draft of this Note. In addition, my thinking on this
subject benefited greatly from attending the Winter 1998 Academics for the Second
Amendment conference.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. II. Note that neither the punctuation nor the capitalization of
the Second Amendment is uniformly reported. Another version has four commas.
Variations in such details were common in the early days of our nation, since documents
were hand copied. See, e.g., Letter from Marlene McGuirl, Chief, British-American Law
Division, Library of Congress (Oct. 29, 1976).
2. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
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have concentrated on the Bill of Rights to the exclusion of the Second
and the Third Amendments. 3 One can easily understand why the
Third Amendment-which provides that "No Soldier shall, in time of
peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner,
not in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law"-has
been largely ignored by the Court, but the Second Amendment
cannot be as readily regarded as irrelevant in our modem times.
Indeed, the Second Amendment is the source of much modem-
day controversy in both political and academic circles.4 Nevertheless,
the Court has repeatedly denied certiorari on cases which, if decided,
could answer basic interpretative questions such as whether the
amendment provides an individual or collective right and what type
of "arms" are protected under the amendment.5 The only case in
which the Supreme Court has discussed the right at length is the 1939
decision United States v. Miller.6 The Court's principal ruling on the
applicability of the Second Amendment to the States is the 1886 case
of Presser v. Illinois,7 which is a pre-incorporation doctrine case. The
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Note that the author uses "exclusion" to mean not addressed by the Court, since
the Court has held that other provisions of the Bill of Rights, namely the Seventh
Amendment, are not incorporated against state action. The Court has never addressed
the incorporation of the Second or Third Amendment post-incorporation doctrine. In the
1886 case of Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), the Court held that the Second
Amendment is not directly applicable to the states. However, this was a pre-incorporation
doctrine case.
4. Note the increase in "gun control" debates in contemporary politics and in
academic scholarship on the Second Amendment over the last several years. See generally
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV.
461 (1995).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1614 (1993); Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1047 (1991); Sandidge v. United States, 520 A.2d 1057 (D.C. 1987), cerL denied, 484 U.S.
868 (1987); Masters v. State, 685 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
853 (1985); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 696 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 426 U.S.
948 (1976); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010
(1972); Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521 (NJ. 1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 812 (1969).
6. 307 U.S. 1764 (1939). For an explanation of the lack of Second Amendment cases,
see Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-
Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 108 (1987) ("Until the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court had few occasions to give serious attention to the Second Amendment. The federal
government did not regulate firearms, the Bill of Rights had not yet been applied to the
states, and the Court only occasionally mentioned the Second Amendment.").
7. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
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Supreme Court, in the 1833 case of Barron v. Baltimore, held that the
provises of the Bill of Rights served as restraints upon the national
government only, and were not applicable to the states.8 Since ours is
a system of "dual sovereignty," whatever restrictions on government
actions the Second Amendment provides would apply only to the
federal government, absent incorporation through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the modem
incorporation doctrine, as articulated by the Court in Duncan v.
Louisiana, the Court's inquiry focuses on whether the right at issue is
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice." 9
This may change, however, because during the last week of its
1997 term, the United States Supreme Court decided Printz v. United
States.'0 While the majority continued its recent trend of resurrecting
federalism and the Tenth Amendment"-striking the provision of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act12 imposing requirements on
state law enforcement officers as an unconstitutional violation of the
principles of federalism13-Justice Thomas wrote a provocative
concurrence in which he invited the Court to interpret the substantive
right protected by the Second Amendment. 14 Neither party raised the
issue of the Second Amendment. The issue in Printz concerned the
scope of Congress' powers under the Interstate Commerce Clause,
and yet Justice Thomas, sua sponte, flagged one of the main problems
surrounding the amendment, namely the absence of any recent
Supreme Court ruling as to the nature of the substantive right
protected. Justice Thomas wrote:
Even if we construe Congress' authority to regulate interstate
commerce to encompass those intrastate transactions that
"substantially affect" interstate commerce, I question whether
Congress can regulate the particular transactions at issue here. The
Constitution, in addition to delegating certain enumerated powers
8. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
9. 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
10. 521 U.S. -, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
11. This recent trend began in 1995, with the Court's decision in United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See generally Daniel H. Cole & Carol S. Comer, Rhetoric,
Reality, and the Law of Unfunded Federal Mandates, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 103 (1997);
Lynn A. Baker, Federalism." The Argument From Article V, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 923
(1997).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1993). Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968,18 U.S.C.
§ 921-928 (1968), by enacting the Brady Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1993).
13. The Court, in Printz, held that the Act imposed an unconstitutional obligation on
state officers to execute federal laws, which is inconsistent with the concept of government
that the framers accepted-a system of dual sovereignty. "The Framers rejected the
concept of a central government that would act upon and through the States, and instead
designed a system in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent
authority over the people." Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2367.
14. See iL at 2385.
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to Congress, places whole areas outside the reach of Congress'
regulatory authority .... The Second Amendment... appears to
contain [such] an express limitation on the government's
authority.15
This Note contends that Justice Thomas is fight; the time is long
overdue for the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari on a
case concerning the meaning of the Second Amendment. The Court
has shirked its duty long enough. The Court's role, according to
Marbury v. Madison,16 is to interpret the Constitution. This includes
fashioning the contours of a right which the Framers thought
important enough to place second among the first ten amendments.
Should the Court accept Justice Thomas' invitation and
determine whether the Second Amendment protects a personal fight
to keep and bear arms, the next issue commanding the Court's
attention-a question the Court has not addressed at length since the
incorporation process began-is whether the Second Amendment
protects "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" against state,
as well as Federal, infringement. 17 Notice, however, that should the
Court hold that the Second Amendment provides only a collective
right (that is, a right of the states to have an armed militia free from
federal interference), then discussion of whether the right should be
incorporated becomes nonsensical since there is no need to
incorporate a right which belongs to the states against state action.
Only individual rights need be guaranteed against both federal and
state action.
Part I of this Note sets forth the competing schools of thought as
to the nature of the right protected by the Second Amendment, and
concludes that the emerging consensus that the right is only an
individual right is inaccurate. Rather, the right was the result of a
political compromise, intending to provide both a collective and an
individual right. Part II discusses the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth
15. Id. Justice Thomas further wrote:
This Court has not had recent occasion to consider the nature of the substantive
right safeguarded by the Second Amendment .... Perhaps, at some future date,
this Court will have the opportunity to determine whether Justice Story was
correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms "has justly been considered, as
the palladium of the liberties of the republic."
16. 5 U.S. 136 (1803).
17. Note that the Court need not fully interpret the scope or nature of the Second
Amendment in order to incorporate the right against State action. The First Amendment,
for example, was incorporated in the early 1920's before the Court clarified the
interpretation of the amendment. In fact, it took the Court another sixty years to flesh out
the First Amendment doctrine. Likewise, in Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court, while
incorporating the right to jury trial in criminal cases, noted that it need not fully define the
scope of the right. 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968).
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Amendment, and the incorporation doctrine from historical and
doctrinal perspectives. Part III examines the various routes the Court
could take to apply Second Amendment protection against state, as
well as federal action. Part III also includes: (1) an analysis of the
Second Amendment under the current incorporation doctrine; and
(2) a critique of the Court's current approach. This article concludes
that there is a strong case for incorporating the Second Amendment
within the Court's current framework. Part IV envisions what the
right might look like if the Court were to determine that the Second
Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms. The
author proposes two possible tests for judicial review under the
Second Amendment: (1) a hybrid test, combining various tests used in
the First Amendment jurisprudence; and (2) an "unduly
burdensome" test, inquiring into whether a regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of an
individual seeking to exercise his or her Second Amendment right.
The author then applies the two tests to two California Penal Codes,
demonstrating that a judicially-enforced Second Amendment would
not be "fatal in fact" to all gun control legislation.
1. The Nature and Scope of the Right: Individual, Collective, or
Other?
A. Three Main Schools of Thought
"To put it mildly, the Second Amendment is not at the forefront
of constitutional discussion, at least as registered in what the academy
regards as the venues for such discussion-law reviews, casebooks,
and other scholarly legal publications.' u8 Among those scholars who
have written on the Second Amendment, there are at least two, and
possibly three, schools of thought: (1) that which views the right as an
individual right;19 (2) that which views the right as a collective right;20
and (3) arguably a third school exists, that which contends that,
regardless of the nature of the right in the 18th century, we should
ignore the Second Amendment today because of changes in
American culture and society.21 The individual right and the
18. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE LJ. 637, 639-
40 (1989).
19. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the
Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983).
20. See, e.g., Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL.
L. REV. 107 (1991).
21. See, e.g., David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE Li. 551 (1991). Note that Williams does not
represent a "school of thought" in the sense that the other two views do, since he does
November 1998]
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collective right schools of thought, while diametrically opposed as to
the nature of the right, do have at least one thing in common: both
schools of thought invoke textualist, originalist, and structural
approaches of constitutional interpretation. 22 In contrast, the third
school of thought takes a more prudential approach, viewing the
Constitution as an evolving document which should be interpreted in
light of the changes in our society.
(1) An Individual Right
Under the individual right interpretation, the Second
Amendment secures a right to individuals, much like the other rights
included in the Bill of Rights. Thus, "the people" of the Second
Amendment are the same people as those mentioned in the First
Amendment and in other parts of the Bill of Rights. Under the logic
of this interpretation, any reading of the amendment that does not
provide an individual right is undermined by the very text of the
amendment. 23 Thus, civil rights attorney Don Kates reasons that:
[T]o justify an exclusively states right view the following set of
propositions must be accepted: (1) when the first Congress drafted
the Bill of Rights it used "right of the people" in the first
amendment to denote a right of individuals (assembly); (2) then,
some sixteen words later, it used the same phrase in the second
amendment to denote a right belonging exclusively to the states; (3)
but then, forty-six words later, the fourth amendment's "right of the
people" had reverted to its normal individual right meaning; (4)
"right of the people" was again used in the natural sense in the
ninth amendment; and (5) finally, in the tenth amendment the first
Congress specifically distinguished "the states" from "the people,"
although it had failed to do so in the second amendment.24
In other words, the individual right school of thought argues that
the language "the right of the people" that appears throughout the
Bill of Rights should be interpreted as meaning the same thing when
reading the Second, First or Fourth Amendment. To interpret this
identical language differently when reading the Second Amendment
could be damaging to the entire Bill of Rights "since, if one 'right of
the people' could be held not to apply to individuals, then so could
others."25
not have many, if any, adherents.
22. See generally PHILIP BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982). Bobbit lays out
six "modalities" of constitutional argument: textual, historical, structural, doctrinal,
prudential, and ethical. See id. at 25-28, 9-24, 39-58, 74-92, 93-119. See also Levinson,
supra note 18, at 643-657 (analyzing the Second Amendment under each of Bobbit's six
"modalities").
23. See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 466.
24. Kates, supra note 19, at 218.
25. Reynolds, supra note 4, at 466. See also Kates, supra note 19, at 218; William Van
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Those who advocate an individual right also argue that the
introductory phrase, "well regulated militia," does not negate the
right recognized by the amendment. 26 Yale Law School Professor
Akhil Amar criticized the states' rights reading as placing too much
emphasis on the word "militia" which appears only in the
amendment's subordinate clause. The phrase "the people" appears
at the core of the amendment. In a 1991 article, Amar argues:
The ultimate right to keep and bear arms belongs to "the people,"
not to the "states." As the language of the Tenth Amendment
shows ... when the Constitution means "states" it says so....
"[T]he people" at the core of the Second Amendment are the same
"people" at the heart of the Preamble and the First Amendment,
namely Citizens.27
Brannon Denning added that:
While the preamble to the Second Amendment reflects a faith in
the citizen militia and the ability of that institution to serve as a
vehicle through which "We the People" could defend ourselves
against a tyrannical government, it does not follow that the "right
to keep and bear arms" belongs therefore only to "the People" as
an undifferentiated mass, and not that group's constituent
members.28
Moreover, Amar notes that the word "militia" had a different
meaning 200 years ago. "Nowadays, it is quite common to speak
loosely of the National Guard as 'the state militia,' but 200 years ago,
any band of paid, semiprofessional, part-time volunteers, like today's
Guard, would have been called 'a select corps' or 'select
militia' .... "29
A variation to the individual right interpretation, sometimes
called the "hybrid interpretation, '30 argues that the amendment
protects an individual right, but applies only to ownership and use of
firearms suitable for militia or military purposes. The Court seemed
to have taken this approach in the 1939 decision of United States v.
Miller,3l where the Court stated that the purpose of the Second
Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236,
1237-38 (1994).
26. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 25, at 1242; Kates, supra note 19, at 212.
27. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1166
(1991).
28. Letter from Brannon Denning to the author (May 28,1998) (on file with author).
29. Amar, supra note 27, at 1166. See also Kates, supra note 19, at 214-18; David T.
Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second
Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 623-28 (1986); Letters From The Federal
Farmer (III, XVIII), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 242,341-42 (H. Storing ed.,
1981).
30. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 29, at 561.
31. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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Amendment is to render possible and assure the continued
effectiveness of the militia.32 This is discussed in greater detail in Part
IID.
(2) A Collective Right
The collective right school of thought argues that the Second
Amendment provides only a narrow guarantee for States to maintain
organized reserve military units.33 Those who ascribe to this view
criticize the individual right school as blindly focusing on the second
half of the amendment-"the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed"-while largely ignoring the preamble "a
well regulated Militia." This school of thought emphasizes that the
Second Amendment is the only amendment with a preamble
establishing its purpose of preserving national security and civic order
through "a well regulated Militia." 34 The collective right school also
criticizes the individual right school for ignoring the Constitution's
treason clause in Article HI, Section 3 when they argue that the
purpose of the Second Amendment includes armed insurrection.35
Historian Michael Bellesiles contends that:
The context for the amendment was the antifederalist fear that the
Constitution diminished state power, particularly in granting
Congress authority to "provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining the Militia" (Article I, Section 8). The debates
addressing the Second Amendment demonstrate that no one cared
about an individual right to bear arms; they were concerned with
the fate of the militia. James Madison formulated this amendment
as a political response to the anti-federalists, guaranteeing state
control of the militia yet promising federal support.36
Bellesiles notes that county probate records (inventories of
property after a death) show that gun ownership was the exception in
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and that gun ownership
did not become common until industrialization, and even then
ownership was prevalent only in urban areas. Bellesiles admits that
he was "puzzled by the absence of what [he] assumed would be found
32. See id. at 178.
33. See, e.g., Henigan, supra note 20; Donald L. Beschle, Reconsidering the Second
Amendment: Constitutional Protection for Right of Security, 9 HAMLINE L. REV. 69
(1986); Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the
Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HiST. 22 (1984).
34. See Garry Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, pp.
62-72; Cress, supra note 33, at 22-42; Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed
Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961
(1975); Henigan, supra note 20, at 107-29.
35. See Michael A. Bellesiles, The Origins of Gun Culture in the United States, 1760-
1865, J. AM. HIST. 425,454 (1996).
36. Id.
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in every record: guns." 37  In other words, contrary to the picture
painted by the National Rifle Association and others who favor an
individual rights reading of the amendment, gun ownership was not
universal, or even close to universal, in the eighteenth century.
Bellesiles argues that the common belief that guns are deeply rooted
in our nation's history and psyche is an erroneous belief and that
history indicates that "[t]he gun culture grew with the gun industry."38
Gun control advocate Dennis Henigan reads the Amendment as
protecting the states against federal interference with the states' right
to have an armed militia.3 9 In other words, the right of the people to
keep and bear arms includes only those "people" who are members
of the state's militia40 According to Henigan, the only legitimate
State militia is the National Guard.4' Since the National Guard is a
federal force, however, it is difficult to see how the National Guard
protects the states' right to have an armed militia independent of the
national government.42 Henigan further argues that an individual
rights interpretation is an "insurrectionists theory" that "represents a
profoundly dangerous doctrine of unrestrained individual rights
which, if adopted by the courts, would threaten the rule of law
itself."43
(3) A Right Which is Inapplicable in Today's Society
A possible third school of thought contends that even if the right
is read historically as an individual right, that reading is no longer
sensible because of changes in our culture. Indiana University School
of Law Professor David C. Williams argues for the necessity of
looking closely into the meaning of "the Body of the People" keeping
37. Id. at 427. Bellesiles was studying county probate records for a project on the legal
and economic evolution of the early American frontier.
38. Id. at 426. Bellesiles notes that "[p]robate records are not a perfect source for
information," but that they still provide "much information on common household objects
and can be used as a starting point for determining the level of gun ownership." Id- at 428.
An examination of more than a thousand probate records, which listed
everything from acreage to broken cups, from the frontiers of northern New
England to western Pennsylvania for the years 1765-1790 revealed that only 14
percent of the inventories included firearms; over half of those guns (53 percent)
were listed as broken or otherwise dysfunctional.
Id. at 427.
39. See DENNIS A. HENIGAN ET AL., GUNS AND THE CONSTrnTTION: THE MYTH OF
SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECION FOR FIREARMS IN AMERICA 2 (1995).
40. See Henigan, supra note 20, at 108.
41. See HENIGAN ET AL., supra note 39, at 2.
42. See Col. Charles S. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian
Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 341 (1994).
43. Henigan, supra note 20, at 110.
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in mind the tradition of civic republicanism.44 Williams contends that:
Steeped in the tradition of civic republicanism, the proponents of
the Second Amendment believed that the government and the
citizenry should dedicate themselves to the Common Good: a good
common to all, shared by all. Of necessity, for a Common Good to
exist, however, the citizenry must be sufficiently homogenous to
share common interests. In that sense, the citizenry is not a
collection of independent individuals but an organic and unified
entity. The constitutional right to arms belongs to this body of the
people, organized into a universal militia, so that it can resist a
corrupt federal government. Violence used by the government for
its own selfish ends is tyranny. Violence used by a faction of the
people for its own selfish ends is illegitimate rebellion. Violence
used by the Body of the People for the Common Good, however, is
legitimate revolution. 45
Wendy Brown, a Women's Studies Professor at University of
California at Santa Cruz, argues that the republican right of
revolution presupposes a virtuous citizenry, and since we no longer
have such a populace, the Second Amendment should no longer be
read as guaranteeing an individual right to bear arms. 46 According to
Brown, we should not accept all aspects of the republican ideology
which dominated the Framer's time period, and should reject its
"offensive elements" such as the sexism and violence suggested by the
Second Amendment.47
Others argue that the National Guard is the present day "militia"
protected by the Amendment. 48 In other words, the National Guard
has become the backbone of the militia leaving the Second
Amendment useless. For example, in Commonwealth v. Davis,49 a
Massachusetts state court held that its state constitution, which
provided that the people have a right to keep and bear arms for the
common defense, provided only a collective right.50  The
Massachusetts court reasoned that the language "for the common
defense" referred to service in a broadly based, organized militia.
The court also distinguished its constitutional provision from other
44. David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution:
Conjuring With the People, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 879, 881 (1996).
45. Id. at 881-82.
46. See Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic
Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson's Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE LJ.
661, 663-65 (1989).
47. Id. at 663-64.
48. See HENIGAN ET AL., supra note 39, at 2.
49. 343 N.E.2d 847 (1976).
50. Note that this provision of the Massachusetts Constitution is different than the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution; the latter does not include the
language "for the common defense." This language was explicitly rejected by the United
States Senate when considering the Second Amendment.
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state constitutions which do not include the phrase "for the common
defense."' With regard to the changes over time, the court noted
that the colonists distrusted standing armies and preferred to rely on
a militia-consisting primarily of civilians and occasional soldiers-
for protection.52 Noting that militiamen customarily furnished their
own equipment, the court stated that a law forbidding individuals to
keep arms that were used in service of the militia would have
interfered with its effectiveness and thus offended the Constitution.5 3
The court also noted that since times have changed with the advent of
the National Guard, which is equipped and supported by public
funds, the problem addressed by the constitutional provision was no
longer of concern. 54 University of Tennessee Law Professor Glenn
Reynolds argues that this reading wholly ignores the fact that the
"militia" referred to in the Second Amendment "was to be composed
of the entire populace, for only such a body could serve as a check on
the government." 55 "Indeed, both English and American history had
led Americans to be very suspicious of 'select' militias. Such bodies,
composed of those deemed politically reliable by authorities, had
played unfortunate roles in the past, and were regarded with the same
suspicion as standing armies. '56
In response to Anti-Federalists' concern over Article I, Section 8,
which gives Congress the power to "raise and support armies," the
Federalists argued that the universal armament of individual
American people eliminated any concern over this Congressional
power.57 According to the Federaliststs, any risk of a federal standing
army is countered by the existence of a militia which is dependent
upon universal armament. Hamilton wrote:
It is not easy to conceive a possibility that dangers so formidable
can assail the whole union as to demand a force considerable
enough to place our liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if we
take into our view the aid to be derived from the militia, which
51. Davis, 343 N.E.2d at 849.
52. See id. at 848.
53. See id. at 849.
54. See id.
55. Reynolds, supra note 4, at 475.
56. Id. at 476.
57. See, e.g., NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION HELD AT
PHILADELPHIA (1787). Noah Webster, in the first major Federalist pamphlet, wrote:
Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they are in
almost every kingdom of Europe. The supreme power in America cannot
enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the whole body of the people are
armed, and constitute a force superior to any bands of regular troops than can be,
on any pretense, raised in the United States.
I at43.
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ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful
auxiliary.58
Madison added that a standing army of 25,000 to 30,000 men
seeking to oppress the people would be offset by "a militia amounting
to near a half million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by
men chosen from among themselves. '59
(4) The Second Amendment as a Political Compromise Intended to Provide
Both a Collective and an Individual Right
The divided schools of thought argue that the Second
Amendment provides either a collective right or an individual right,
but history suggests that the framers intended to recognize both
principles. 60 Early commentators acknowledged this dual purpose.
For example, Revolutionary War veteran, St. George Tucker, who
later became a professor of law at the College of William and Mary
and a Virginia Supreme Court justice, noted that "[t]he right of self
defense is the first law of nature. '61 Tucker also recognized the
danger of standing armies ("[w]henever standing armies are kept up,
and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any color
or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated,
is on the brink of destruction"). 62 Similarly, William Rawle, a noted
legal scholar who sat in a state convention which ratified the Bill of
Rights, divided the Second Amendment into two clauses and
discussed each separately:
In the Second Article, it is declared that a well regulated militia is
necessary to the security of a free state: a proposition from which
few will dissent. Although in actual war, the services of regular
58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 173-74 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mentor ed. 1961).
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961).
60. See generally David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of
the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1 (1987) (Hardy explores the origins of the militia concept
and of the individual right to bear arms, and the merger of the two concepts which, he
argues, lead to the present Second Amendment). See also Hardy, supra note 29, at 561
(arguing "in light of the historical evidence, documentation of the intent of the drafters of
the Second Amendment and their contemporaries, and the need to maintain a consistent
standard of constitutional interpretation, the individual rights approach is the only
approach that has any validity").
61. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, WITH REFERENCE TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 143 (The Lawbook Exchange 1996)
(1803).
62. 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND,
WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS 300 (St. George Tucker
ed., 1803). Tucker's accomplishments include serving as a colonel in the Virginia militia
during the Revolutionary War, serving as one of the delegates (along with Madison and
Tench Coxe) to the Annapolis Convention, and publishing a five-volume edition of
Blackstone's Commentaries.
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troops are confesedly more valuable, yet... the militia form the
palladium of the country .... The corollary from the first position
is, that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed. The prohibition is general. No clause in the Constitution
could by any rule of construction be conceived to give Congress a
right to disarm the people. 63
Similar understandings were later voiced by Justice Joseph Story
and legal scholar Thomas Cooley.64 Cooley, for example, wrote:
It may be supposed from the phraseology of this provision that the
right to keep and bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia; but
this would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent. The
militia, as has been elsewhere explained, consists of those persons
who, under the law, are liable to the performance of military duty,
and are officered and enrolled for service when called upon.
But... if the right were limited to those enrolled, the purpose of
this guaranty might be defeated altogether by the action or neglect
to act of the government it was meant to hold in check. The
meaning of the provision undoubtedly is, that the people, from
whom the militia must be taken, shall have the right to keep and
bear arms, and they need no permission or regulation of law for the
purpose.65
David Hardy, a staff attorney at the Office of the Solicitor of the
United States Department of the Interior, argues that the Second
Amendment's militia and its right to bear arms provisions have
different origins and theoretical underpinnings which were joined into
a single sentence in order to satisfy both schools of thought.66 While
the militia provision found its primary constituency among
conservatives-particularly Virginia's landed gentry-and derived
from Classical Republican thought, the individual right to bear arms
provision was primarily advanced by the Radical movement-
particularly in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts-and had its roots in
the English Declaration of Rights and from Enlightenment sources.67
One group, influenced by the Classical Republicans, saw the
63. W. RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION 125 (2d ed. 1829).
64. See 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
746-47 (1833); THOMAS COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 298-99 (3d ed. 1898).
65. COOLEY, supra note 64, at 298-99. See generally Hardy, supra note 29, at 611-15.
66. See Hardy, supra note 60, at 3.
67. See id. Hardy asks:
Is it reasonable to assume that John Adams, obsessed with the risk of mob rule,
and Thomas Jefferson, who so lightly praised the virtues of frequent revolutions,
were of a single mind when it came to popular armaments? When Virginia
constitutionalized the principle that a well-regulated militia was necessary to the
proper defense of a free state, and Pennsylvania instead guaranteed that the
people had a right to bear arms for defense of themselves and the state, was there
in fact an identical understanding which motivated each statement?
Id. at 2-3.
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establishment of a stable republic that could survive in a hostile
environment as the highest priority. For this group, to emphasize
citizen's rights against such a republic was to place the cart before
the horse. The other group, influenced by Enlightenment thought,
saw the establishment of the rights of man, around which a free
republic or democracy might be construed, as the main priority. A
statement, rather than a command, regarding the value of the
militia "to a free state" appealed to the first group; a command that
the right "of the people" to bear arms shall not be infringed
appealed to the second.68
B. Supreme Court Doctrine
The Supreme Court has never expressly stated whether the
Second Amendment provides a collective, individual, or other right to
keep and bear arms. The Court hinted that the Second Amendment
provides an individual right in United States v. Verdugo-Urquirdez.6 9
This case involved the interpretation of the phrase "the people" in
the Fourth Amendment. The Court unanimously held that the term
"the people" had the same meaning in the Fourth Amendment as it
does in the Preamble to the Constitution and in the First, Second,
Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.70
"[T]he people" seems to have been a term of art employed in select
parts of the Constitution. The Preamble declares that the
Constitution is ordained and established by "the People of the
United States." The Second Amendment protects "the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms," and the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments provide that certain rights and powers are retained
by and reserved to "the people."71
The first case in which the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
interpret the Second Amendment is the 1876 case of United States v.
Cruikshank.72 The Court summarized the charges in Cruikshank in
the following manner:
The general charge in the first eight counts is that of "banding,"
and in the second eight, that of "conspiring" together to injure,
oppress, threaten, and intimidate... citizens of the United States,
of African descent and persons of color, with the intent thereby to
hinder and prevent them in their free exercise and enjoyment of
rights and privileges "granted and secured" to them "in common
with all other good citizens of the United States by the constitution
68. Id. at 4.
69. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
70. See id. at 265.
71. Id.
72. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
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and laws of the United States."73
Although the central holding of the case concerned the Court's
interpretation of the 1870 Act to Enforce the Right of Citizens of the
United States,74 the Court noted that the right of the people to keep
and bear arms existed prior to the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution.75 In other words, the right was a natural or inalienable
right, and such rights cannot be granted by the Constitution since they
naturally belong to each person.76 The Court held that since the
Second Amendment guaranteed a right of the people to keep and
bear arms as against the federal government (i.e., not to be infringed
by Congress), the federal government lacked the power to punish a
private person's act which violated the right to keep and bear arms.
The Court suggested that citizens had to look to the states for
protection against any violation by their fellow citizens of their
rights.77
The Court directly addressed the meaning of the Second
Amendment only once, in the 1939 case United States v. Miller.8 In
Miller, the Court unanimously upheld Congressional enactment of
the National Firearms Act, making it a crime to possess a sawed-off
shotgun without paying a federal tax.7 9 The Court limited its decision,
stating only that in the absence of proof that a sawed-off shotgun "has
some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument." 80 Thus,
the question that is left to be answered by the Court is whether the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear
arms that are "part of the ordinary military equipment or could
contribute to the common defense."81 Commentators who interpret
Miller as a collective rights ruling are mistaken because the Court
specifically stated that "the Militia comprised all males physically
capable of acting in concert for the common defense," who "were
expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the
73. Id at 548.
74. See icL at 546.
75. See id at 553. Such a right "is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it
in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence." Id
76. See, e.g., John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, Cato's Letters, in THE ENGLISH
LIBERTARIAN HERrrAGE 1720-21 (Daniel L. Jacobson ed., 1965). Trenchard and Gordon
argued that men can never give up their natural, inalienable rights-such as the right to
self-defense- in exchange for government protection; they are as much a part of a man as
his soul or conscience. See id.
77. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
78. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
79. Id at 183.
80. Id. at 178.
81. Id
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kind in common use at the time." 82 The Court never mentioned the
term "National Guard" in its opinion, "and it remanded for evidence,
not that Miller was taking part in an immediately militia related
activity, but that he was carrying a weapon that was 'part of the
ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the
common defense."' 83 Although Justice McReynolds (writing for the
Court in Miller), did state that the Second Amendment should be
interpreted from the point of view of ensuring the efficacy of the
militia,84 the Court's opinion is more interesting for its implicit
rejection of many of the Government's arguments that are virtually
indistinguishable from the arguments made by members of the
collective right school of thought.85  Furthermore, Miller's
precedential value in future litigation is arguably limited since the
argument presented to the Court was one-sided. Only the
Government submitted briefs and argued before the Court, and no
appearance was made on behalf of the defendants/appeees.8 6
If the Supreme Court interprets the Second Amendment as
providing an individual right (whether as part of its dual purpose-to
provide both a collective and an individual right-or as its sole
purpose), the next issue becomes whether this right applies against
the state governments as well as against federal government
infringement. In Miller v. Texas, the Court confirmed that it had
never decided the issue of whether the Second Amendment applies to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.87 Besides some
recent dicta suggesting that the Second Amendment is incorporated
in the Fourteenth Amendment, this case remains the last word on this
question by a majority of the Court.88
82. Id. at 179.
83. Hardy, supra note 29, at 561, n.11 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174,
178 (1939)).
84. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 ("With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and
render possible the effectiveness of such forces [Militia forces] the declaration and
guarantee of the Second Amendment were made.").
85. See Brief for Appellant at 4-5, United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)
("Indeed, the very language of the Amendment regards membership in a 'well regulated
Militia' as a condition precedent to 'the right of the People to keep bear arms."'). See also
Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations of
United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CuMB. L. REv. 961, 974-76 (1996)
(showing that the alleged "unanimity" of Miller's application in the lower courts "is largely
a function of the lower courts' less-than-honest treatment of Miller's holding").
86. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 174. Defendants themselves did not even appear before the
Supreme Court. Rather than risk an unfavorable outcome in the Supreme Court, the
defendants went along their way as they were legally entitled to do so since the trial court
quashed the indictment. See Denning, supra note 85, at 973 n.65.
87. 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
88. "The full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be
found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in
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II. The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Incorporation Doctrine: A Historical and Doctrinal Perspective
A. The Bil of Rights
The ratification of the United States Constitution can be seen as
a victory for those members of the constitutional convention who
were less suspicious of federal power. The Bill of Rights, however,
can bee seen as a victory for those members who were more
suspicious of federal power and opposed replacing the Articles of
Confederation with the new Constitution. Those who were especially
fearful of a powerful federal government criticized the lack of a Bill
of Rights, claiming that in the absence of any enumeration of
individual rights the national government was not prevented from
invading the rights of the people.
Many Federalists, including James Madison, believed that a Bill
of Rights was not necessary, since the federal government only
possessed enumerated, or limited powers.89 According to Madison,
fear that the federal government would infringe citizens' natural, or
inalienable rights was absurd because the national government could
not act outside its enumerated powers, that is, it possessed only the
power given to it explicitly by the Constitution.90 The national
government was a government of limited powers-limited by the
words of the Constitution. Madison feared that enumeration of
individual rights would open the door for federal government
infringement on rights not explicitly listed in any Bill of Rights.91 In
other words, a Bill of Rights would suggest that the national
government possessed implied powers-that is, powers not explicitly
granted by the Constitution. After all, what need was there to
explicitly prohibit Congress from infringing the right of the people to
bear arms if Congress did not have some implied power, not written
in the Constitution, to do so? Nowhere in the Constitution did the
federal government possess the power to prohibit gun ownership, so
there was no need for an Amendment such as the Second
Amendment. Nevertheless, those who were most concerned about
the Constitution... [such as] the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep
and bear arms . .." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (quoting with
approval Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,502 (1976) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 543).
89. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST bk.
1, 321-28 (Tudor Publishing Co. 1937); 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 764 (1971).
90. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 321-28 (James Madison), reprinted in THE
FEDERALIST bk. 1,321-28 (Tudor Publishing Co. 1937).
91. See id.
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the scope of federal power prevailed and the first ten amendments,
later known as the Bill of Rights, were ratified in 1791.
It was widely accepted that the Bill of Rights had only been
intended by its drafters to restrain the national government. The
Court confirmed this belief in a 1833 decision, Barron v. Baltimore,92
rejecting Barron's contention that the Fifth Amendment prohibition
against the taking of property without just compensation applied to
the state as well as the federal government.93 The effect of the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment turned out not to be the
reversal of Barron, but rather, selective incorporation. 94
B. The Fourteenth Amendment
In Barron v. Baltimore, Chief Justice Marshall (writing for the
majority) stated, in concluding that the Fifth Amendment is not
applicable to the states, that the question presented was "of great
importance, but not of much difficulty."95 According to the Court,
the Constitution had been established by the people of the United
States "for their own government, and not for the government of the
individual state. Each state established a constitution, and, in that
constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers
of its particular government, as its judgment dictated. '96 In those few
instances where the framers envisioned federal intervention in the
states' treatment of its citizens, the Constitution explicitly provides
that the particular provision applies to the states. Article I, Section
10 for example, provides that "[n]o State shall... pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts." 97 Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that:
Had congress [sic], engaged in the extraordinary occupation of
improving the constitutions of the several states by affording the
people additional protection from the exercise of power by their
own governments in matters which concerned themselves alone,
they would have declared this purpose in plain and intelligible
language.98
"Engaging in the extraordinary occupation" 99 was exactly what
92. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
93. See id at 247.
94. Having disabled the "privileges and immunities clause" of the Fourteenth
Amendment, for all practical purposes, the Court applied a doctrine of selective
incorporation. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
95. 32 U.S. 243,247 (1833).
96. Id.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
98. Barron, 32 U.S. at 250.
99. Id.
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the Thirty-Ninth Congress did when it proposed the Fourteenth
Amendment.1°° The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, states
in relevant part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 101
The meaning of this section of the amendment is unclear and has
been the source of much Supreme Court litigation. The first sentence
of Section One was meant to grant blacks citizenship, thus overruling
the Court's infamous decision in Dred Scott v. Sanfordl 02 where the
Court held that a Negro could not become a "citizen" within the
meaning of the Constitution because his "ancestors were imported
into this country, and sold as slaves.' 10 3 Chief Justice Taney, in Dred
Scott, also stated that if African-Americans were regarded as citizens
of the United States, "and entitled to the privileges and immunities of
citizens" then "[iut would give persons of the negro race, who were
recognized [sic] as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right...
to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry
arms wherever they went."'u 4
"The second sentence indicates an intent to protect the freed
blacks, as well as others, from abuses of state power."' 05 Although it
is clear that Congress intended to impose limitations upon the states,
the scope of those limitations, "couched in terms such as 'equal
protection' and 'due process' is unclear.106
In the years since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, a
substantial part of the Supreme Court's workload has been devoted
to defining and redefining those terms. One of the more difficult
issues considered in that process has been the extent to which the
prohibitions of section one encompass the guarantees found in the
100. See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisted, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 255 (1982).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
102. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
103. Id. at 403.
104. Id. at 416-17.
105. Israel, supra note 100, at 256. Although the "one pervading purpose" of the
Reconstruction amendments was to guarantee "the freedom of the slave race," the
protections afforded were not limited to those of "African decent." Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70-72 (1872). Congressional support of the amendment was also
concerned with discriminatory actions that southern states had taken against white
loyalists, and there was discussion of the equity of protecting "all persons, whether citizens
or strangers [i.e., aliens]." R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 217-18 (1977);
accord Israel, supra note 100, at 256 n.18.
106. Israel, supra note 100, at 256.
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Bill of Rights-that is, the extent to which the fourteenth
amendment imposes upon the states prohibitions identical or
similar to those imposed upon the federal government by the Bill of
Rights.107
C. The Incorporation Doctrine
The idea-whose chief advocate was Justice Black-that the
"original purpose" of the Fourteenth Amendment was "to guarantee
that thereafter no State could deprive its citizens of the privileges and
protections of the Bill of Rights"'1 8 has never been accepted by a
majority of the Supreme Court. Instead, the Court has chosen to take
the route of selective incorporation.
In 1908, the Supreme Court decided Twining v. New Jersey.109
The Court articulated the test for selective incorporation as an
inquiry into whether the right in question is a "fundamental principle
of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free
government.""10 The Court later refined the doctrine in the 1937 case
of Palko v. Connecticut."'
In Palko, the defendant was indicted in Fairfield County,
Connecticut, for first degree murder. A jury found him guilty of
murder in the second degree, and he was sentenced to confinement in
the state prison for life." 2 Thereafter, the State of Connecticut
appealed the jury's second degree conviction to the Supreme Court of
Errors, and the presiding trial judge allowed this appeal."3 The
double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution prohibits the federal government from this practice. On
appeal, Palko's second degree murder conviction was reversed and a
new trial granted.114 Before the jury was impaneled, and throughout
the case, Palko argued that the new trial placed him twice in jeopardy
for the same offense and thus violated the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.115 The trial court overruled Palko's
objection, and the jury returned a verdict of first degree murder,
resulting in the court sentencing Palko to death." 6 Palko appealed,
arguing that "whatever is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment is
107. Id.
108. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,74-75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
109. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
110. Id. at 106.
111. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
112. See id. at 320-21.
113. See id. at 321.
114. See id
115. See icL at 322.
116. See id.
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forbidden by the Fourteenth also." 117
The Supreme Court rejected Palko's argument, holding that
there is no general rule that "[w]hatever would be a violation of the
original bill of rights (Amendments I to VIII) if done by the federal
government is now equally unlawful by force of the Fourteenth
Amendment if done by a state." 8 Justice Cardozo, delivering the
opinion of the Court, noted that a line divides the Bill of Rights into
two categories." 9 One group, which includes the First Amendment's
freedom of speech, is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment to
apply against state abridgment. The other group, which includes the
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in civil cases at common law
where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, is not
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court ruled that
trial by jury in civil cases may be modified by a state or abolished
altogether. 20  In comparing and contrasting the first eight
amendments Cardozo explained:
In these and other situations immunities that are valid as against
the federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular
amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment,
become valid as against the states. 121
Cardozo reasoned that although the rights protected by the Fifth,
Sixth, and Seventh Amendments "may have value and importance...
they are not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."' 22
Moreover, "[t]o abolish them is not to violate a 'principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental." ' 123  According to the Court, "[flew would be so
narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened system
of justice would be impossible without them [the rights protected by
the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments]."'124
Since Palko, the Supreme Court has changed the test, shifting the
inquiry from whether rejecting incorporation of a right would "violate
those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
117. Id.
118. Id. at 323. The Court reversed Palko on this precise point in Benton v. Maryland,
holding that protection against double jeopardy is so fundamental that it must be
incorporated. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
119. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,323 (1937).
120. See id. at 324. Note that at this time (1937), the Court had not yet incorporated the
Sixth Amendment (right to jury trial for criminal cases). The Sixth Amendment was
incorporated in Duncan v. Louisiana. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
121. Palko, 302 U.S. at 324-25.
122. Id. at 325.
123. Id.
124. Ild.
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base of all our civil and political institutions' ' ' 1z5 to whether the right
is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice.' 1 26
Under the incorporation test, the Supreme Court has
incorporated virtually the entire Bill of Rights. All of the rights
which the Court has incorporated have been held to the precise
meaning when applied against a state as when applied against the
federal government, that is, the right is said to be incorporated "jot-
for-jot." The only exceptions are the grand jury clause, the Seventh
Amendment, and non-unanimous jury verdicts.12 7
D. Intent of the Framers and Its Role in Incorporation
In incorporating several of the Bill of Rights' freedoms into the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has specifically relied on the
intent of the framers. 128 Admittedly, there are difficulties with
original intent, such as ascertaining the intention of a collective
decision making body;129  determining "whether a provision
establishes specific conceptions or general concepts";130 extrapolating
the framers' "intent" with respect to new problems or "old problems
in dramatically changed circumstances"; 131 and the possibility that
"the framers intended to delegate to people in the future the power to
make decisions about what the provision means in the particular
circumstances.1 32 Nevertheless, the Court has stated that "[i]t is
never to be forgotten that, in the construction of the language of the
Constitution... we are to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the
condition of the men who framed the instrument."'133 In South
Carolina v. United States, the Court noted that "[t]he Constitution is a
written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it
meant when adopted it means now." 134 Likewise, the Senate
Judiciary Committee of the Forty-Second Congress noted that "[i]n
construing the Constitution we are compelled to give it such
interpretation as will secure the result which was intended to be
accomplished by those who framed it and the people who adopted
125. 1d at 328 (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312,316 (1926)).
126. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
127. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (holding that while the Sixth
Amendment requires federal juries be unanimous in criminal convictions, incorporation of
the Amendment does not require state convictions by unanimous verdicts).
128. See, e.g., Duncan, 406 U.S. at 151,156,160.
129. See STONE ET AL., CONSTUMTONAL LAW 43 (3d ed. 1996).
130. Id at 42.
131. IM. at 43.
132. Id. at 42.
133. Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
134. 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
THE INCORPORATION CONUNDRUM
it."1135
I. Incorporation of the Second Amendment Under the
Modern Doctrine
"The Court has not hesitated to re-examine past decisions
according the Fourteenth Amendment a less central role in the
preservation of basic liberties than that which was contemplated by its
Framers when they added the Amendment to our constitutional
scheme."'136
Since the process of incorporation began, the Court has
considered incorporation of all of the first eight amendments except
the Third Amendment, the Excessive Fines and Excessive Bail
Clauses of the Eighth Amendment, and the Second Amendment.
This section examines the feasibility of incorporating the Second
Amendment.
A. Incorporation Options
The Supreme Court could apply the Second Amendment to the
states through at least three different means. Under the first method,
and probably most consistent with the intention of the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court could hold that the Second
Amendment directly applies to the states through the privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 137 Litigants before
the Supreme Court should argue this theory of incorporation as an
alternative theory, as it is the least plausible means under which the
Court is likely to rule that the Second Amendment applies to the
states. Starting with the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court rendered
the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
impotent for all practical purposes except preventing states from
discriminating against African-American citizens. 138 Moreover, if the
Court steps up to settle the controversy and hold that the Second
Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms
which is also applicable to the states, it is highly unlikely that the
135. Report No. 21, Senate Judiciary Committee, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (25 Jan. 1872).
136. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5 (1964).
137. See, e.g., Richard L Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 103 YALE LJ. 57 (1993) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment applies
the first eight amendments to the states, and that John Bingham, the principal author of
the Fourteenth Amendment, intended that the effect of the amendment be the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the state governments).
138. 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873) ("We doubt very much whether any action of a State not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of [the privileges or immunities]
provision.").
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Court would take an unnecessary third controversial step by
resurrecting the privileges and immunities clause, a clause which has
been dormant for over a hundred years.
A second possible means of applying the Second Amendment
against the states is to adopt the broader "penumbra," or "zone of
privacy" theory. This approach originated with Justice Douglas in the
1965 right to use contraceptives case, Griswold v. Connecticut.139 The
Court initiated this "zone of privacy" route after it repudiated the use
of the due process clauses to protect un-enumerated economic rights
(also known as the repudiation of the Lochner Era).140 Perhaps the
Court's use of the "penumbra" stemmed from the Court's reluctance
to revive substantive due process for un-enumerated, non-economic
rights in light of the Court's total repudiation of this method for
protecting un-enumerated economic rights. Under this theory:
unenumerated rights protected by the Ninth Amendment could be
defined, in part, by reference to the objectives of the other
amendments-the First (privacy), the Second (security and self-
defense), the Third (protection of home), the Fourth (protection of
house and person), the Fifth (protection of life, liberty, and
property), and the Tenth ("powers" reserved to the people).' 41
The Court, however, has been reluctant to use this approach for
several reasons, including federalism and judicial activism concerns.
Under the third method, the Court could invoke the current
incorporation doctrine to hold that the Second Amendment applies
to the states. This is the most likely approach that the Court would
adopt, should it hold that the Second Amendment is incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Under this approach, the
inquiry turns on whether the "right of the people to keep and bear
arms"'142 is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 43
B. The Modem Incorporation Doctrine
The Court articulated the modern incorporation doctrine in
139. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (The "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance."). Id
140. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (invoking the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate an economic regulation). See also Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 (1915) (finding the right to contract rooted in "property" as well as
"liberty"); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking a federal law that
prohibited interstate railroads from requiring their employees to promise not to join a
labor union). Both Adair and Coppage were overturned during the Court's repudiation of
the Lochner Era. See Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
141. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 170 (1984).
142. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
143. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937).
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Duncan v. Louisiana.144 The test, as stated in Duncan, is whether the
right is "fundamental to the American [or Anglo-American] scheme
of justice."' 45 The Court, however, has never clearly indicated the
period in history upon which this inquiry should be directed (that is,
fundamental at what point in time?). Arguably, the analysis should
be focused on 1868 (the year of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment) and on the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court, however, has never addressed this crucial
question. Furthermore, the Court uses the phrases "American
scheme of justice" and "Anglo-American scheme of justice"
interchangeably, looking to both Britain and America as if there were
no significant differences between "American" and "Anglo-
American.'46
In Duncan v. Louisiana, Duncan was convicted of simple battery
(a misdemeanor in Louisiana), sentenced to sixty days in the county
prison, and fined $150. Duncan appealed, contending that his
conviction was unconstitutional because he was denied a jury trial
under the Louisiana Constitution which guaranteed jury trials only in
cases in which capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may
be imposed.147 The Supreme Court held that Duncan was entitled to
a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 148 The
Court's analysis began with the Fourteenth Amendment--"nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law" and with the following statement:
In resolving conflicting claims concerning the meaning of this
spacious language [the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment], the Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of
Rights for guidance; many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight
Amendments to the Constitution have been held to be protected
against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 149
Next, the Court noted that it has phrased the test for determining
whether a right extended by one of the first eight amendments is also
protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment in a
variety of ways. After listing the various phrases which the Court has
used, the Court emphasized the new approach taken by recent
incorporation cases: "Earlier the Court can be seen as having asked,
when inquiring into whether some particular procedural safeguard
144. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
145. Id. at 149.
146. Id. at 149, 150 n.14.
147. See id. at 146,151.
148. See id. (holding that states must provide criminal defendants the right to trial by
jury in non-petty criminal proceedings).
149. Id- at 147-48.
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was required of a state, if a civilized system could be imagined that
would not accord the particular protection.' '150 The Court then noted
that more recent cases have focused on whether a particular
procedure is fundamental, that is, "necessary to an Anglo-American
regime of ordered liberty.' 1
The Court then proceeded to answer whether the right to jury
trial is "fundamental" or "necessary to an Anglo-American regime of
ordered liberty."' 52 First, the Court looked to the history of trial by
jury in criminal cases, noting that "jury trial in criminal cases had
been in existence and carried impressive credentials traced by many
to the Magna Carta"'153 for several centuries by the time the United
States Constitution was written. The "preservation" and "proper
operation [of the jury trial in criminal cases] as a protection against
arbitrary rule were among the major objectives of the revolutionary
settlement which was expressed in the Declaration and Bill of Rights
of 1689." 154 The Court traced the origins of the jury trial in America
to the English colonists, citing Blackstone for historical support. 155
The Court then looked to the constitutions adopted by the
original states and found it significant that all of these states
guaranteed jury trial.156 Moreover, the Court noted, every state
entering the Union thereafter protected some form of the right to
jury trial in criminal cases. 157
The Court went on to note that "[t]hose who emigrated to this
country from England brought with them this great privilege 'as their
birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law
which had fenced around and interposed barriers on every side
against the approaches of arbitrary power.""' 58
After stating that "even such skeletal history is impressive
support for considering the right to jury trial in criminal cases to be
fundamental to our system of justice," the Court began the next
paragraph noting that the right to a jury trial "continues to receive
strong support.' 5 9 The Court lastly noted that the right to jury trial is
150. 1& at 149 n.14.
151. Id.
152. Id. Another way of phrasing the standard is to say that Courts will enforce "values
which... hav[e] a special importance in the development of individual liberty in American
society, whether or not the value [is] one that [is] theoretically necessary in any system of
democratic government." 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §15.6, at 423 (1983).
153. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968).
154. Id.
155. See id. at 151.
156. See id at 153.
157. See id.
158. Id- at 154.
159. 1&
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granted "in order to prevent oppression by the Government."'16 It is
not entirely clear whether these last two considerations are actual
prongs of the Court's incorporation test, or merely afterthoughts
added to buttress their argument for incorporating yet another right.
Any prong inquiring whether the right at issue has become the status
quo among the states (that is, considering as a factor whether there is
"strong support" for the right among the states today) would seem
odd in light of the anti-majoritarian purpose of the Bill of Rights.
The Court then addressed Louisiana's contention that even if it
must grant jury trials in serious criminal cases it need not do the same
in cases involving petty crimes, such as Duncan's simple battery.161
The Court again looked to history and common law as well as to the
intent of the framers. 62 The Court ultimately concluded that it need
not articulate an exact line that demarcates when the seriousness of
the punishment is enough to require a jury trial. The Court reasoned,
that it was satisfied that the crime at issue here (Duncan's simple
battery, punishable by two years in prison), is a serious crime and thus
Duncan was entitled to jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 63
To summarize, the factors the Duncan Court used to determine
whether a particular provision of the Bill of Rights should be applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment are: (1) whether the
right was a part of the Anglo-American tradition; (2) the treatment of
the right in state constitutions; (3) popular regard for the right; and
(4) the purposes served by the right.
C. Incorporation of the Second Amendment
Under the modem incorporation test, as modified by the Court
in the 1968 case Duncan, the issue is not limited to whether the right
is a "fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the
very idea of free government,"'164 but rather whether the right is
"fundamental to the American [or Anglo-American] scheme of
justice.' 65
(1) The Right to Keep and Bear Arms as Part of the Anglo-American
Tradition
In order to determine whether a right is "fundamental to the
160. id at 155 (citing Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24,31 (1965)).
161. See id. at 159.
162. See id. at 160.
163. See id. at 162.
164. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78,106 (1908).
165. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,150 (1968) (emphasis added).
November 1998] THE INCORPORATION CONUNDRUM S203
American scheme of justice,' 66 it is important to examine the
colonists' "grievances for rights violated in the decade before the war
for independence, and the assertion of their rights in the state bill of
rights, constitutions, and legislation as well as in newspapers and in
writings of the 'founding fathers' of the individual states" since "all
are sources of the federal Bill of Rights."'167
Following the Court's analysis in Duncan as to whether a right is
"fundamental," the first step is to examine the history of the right to
keep and bear arms. The Court, in Duncan, began its analysis into
whether the Sixth Amendment is "fundamental" by stating that it is
"sufficient" for the purposes of the incorporation debate "to say that
by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in criminal cases
had been in existence... in England for several centuries .... "168 A
similar observation can be made of the right at issue in the Second
Amendment. 169 Historian Stephen P. Halbrook wrote, "[s]trongly
influenced by the philosophical classics vigorously insisting on their
common-law rights, the Americans who participated in the
Revolution of 1776 and adopted the Bill of Rights held the individual
right to have and use arms against tyranny to be fundamental.' 170 In
fact, the consensus among American colonists was that universal
ownership of arms was a legal duty.171
To an American of the 18th century, firearms ownership was
thus not only
commonplace, but a civic duty. He lived-as had his ancestors for
generations-under a legal obligation to own arms and be trained
in their use .... he encountered the unanimous opinion that
individual ownership of arms was the sole security and distinction
of a modem republic, and public disarmament the hallmark of
tyranny' 72
For example, the militia laws of New Plymouth colony (which
was later incorporated into Massachusetts) required "every freeman
or other inhabitant of this colony provide for himself and each under
him able to bear arms a sufficient musket and serviceable piece for
166. Id.
167. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS
OF RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES at vii (1989).
168. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151.
169. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 167, at 55-87.
170. Id. at 55.
171. See, e.g., Joyce Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The
Common Law Tradition, 10 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 285, 288 (1983); 1 W. HENING, THE
STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA OF THE
LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619,127 (1823, reprinted 1969); W. MILLS, ARMS AND MEN
20(1956).
172. DAVID T. HARDY, ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
50 (1986).
[Vol. 50HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
THE INCORPORATION CONUNDRUM
war with bandeleros."17 3 This law is typical of the early American
statutes.174 Moreover, Whig political philosophy, which influenced
colonial Americans, and was almost universally accepted in the
colonies, also "underscored the importance of arms bearing."' 75 One
of the earliest Whig writers, Roger Molesworth 7 6 wrote:
A Whig is against the raising or keeping up a standing army in time
of peace.... And therefore the arming and training of all the
freeholders of England, as is our undoubted ancient constitution,
and consequently is our right; so it is the opinion of most Whigs,
that it ought to be put into practice.... Were our militia well
regulated and firearms substituted in place of bows and arrows
we'd need not fear a hundred thousand enemies .... 177
Andrew Fletcher, another early Whig widely read among the
colonists, also stressed the importance of an armed citizenry:
The subjects formerly had a security for their liberty, by having a
sword in their own hands. That security, which is the greatest of all
others, is lost, and not only so, but the sword is put into the hand of
the King by his power over the Militia. For though as to other
things, the constitution be ever so slight, a good militia will always
preserve the public security.178
As mentioned supra Part IA2, the word "militia" had a very different
meaning in the 18th and 19th centuries. 7 9
173. WILLIAM BRIGHAM, THE COMPACT WITH THE CHARTER AND LAWS OF THE
COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH 31 (1836).
174. See id. at 84,184.
175. HARDY, supra note 60, at 41.
176. See id. at 46.
177. ROGER MOLESWORTH, Introduction, FRANCO-GALLIA at xxviii (1721).
Molesworth's writings were found in the libraries of Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and a
number of colonial public libraries. See H. TREVOR COLBURN, THE LAMP OF
EXPERIENCE: WHIG HISTORY AND THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 211,218-25 (1965).
178. ANDREW FLETCHER, A DISCOURSE OF GOVERNMENT WITH RELATION TO
MILrrIAS (1737) in SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 1, 10 (David
Daiches ed., 1979).
179. See e.g., Amar, supra note 27 at 1168 ("Nowadays, it is quite common to speak
loosely of the National Guard as 'the state militia,' but 200 years ago, any band of paid,
semiprofessional, part-time volunteers, like today's Guard, would have been called 'a
select corps' or 'select militia"').
The First Edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published in 1891, defines the word
"militia" as "[t]he body of soldiers in a state enrolled for discipline, but not engaged in
actual service except in emergencies, as distinguished from regular troops or a standing
army." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 774 (1st ed. 1891). The 1872 version of Bouvier's
Law Dictionary, which was specifically adapted to the Constitution and laws of the United
States, defined "militia" as "[t]he military force of the nation, consisting of citizens called
forth to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion." 2 JOHN
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION: WITH REFERENCES TO THE CIVIL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF FOREIGN LAw 179
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The road to the American revolution inspired newspapers to
write public appeals to the people to exercise their right to buy
arms,180 moved colonists to stockpile arms,18 1 and galvanized leaders
such as George Washington, George Mason, and Patrick Henry to
publicly advocate the armament of the American colonists.182 As
Patrick Henry wrote in his famous speech, "Give me liberty or give
me death":
[A] well regulated militia, composed of gentlemen and yeomen, is
the natural strength and only security of a free government....
That the establishment of such a militia is, at this time, peculiarly
necessary....
If we wish to be free-if we mean to preserve inviolate those
inestimable privileges, for which we have been so long
contending,... we must fight! I repeat it, sir, we must fight! An
appeal to arms, and to the God of hosts, is all that is left us! 183
As noted earlier, the Anti-Federalists may have "lost" their
objection to the Federal Constitution, but the inclusion of a Bill of
Rights can be seen as a victory for those who were more skeptical of
the national government.184 George Mason and Patrick Henry185-
(1872).
180. An anonymous article defending Boston colonists' vote requesting their fellow
citizens to buy arms stated:
Nor is there a person either in or out of Parliament, who has justly stated and
proved one single act of that town [Boston], as a public body, to be, we will not
say treasonable or seditious, but even at all illegal.... For it is certainly beyond
human art and sophistry, to prove the British subjects, to whom the privilege of
bearing arms is expressly recognized by the Bill of Rights, and who live in a
Province where the law requires them to be equipped with arms, etc. are guilty of
an illegal act, in calling upon one another to be provided with them, as the law
directs.
BOSTON EVENING POST, April 3, 1769, reprinted in BOSTON UNDER MILITARY RULE,
1768-1769 AS REVEALED IN A JOURNAL OF THE TIMEs 61 (ed. Oliver Morton Dickerson
1936).
Likewise, the New York Journal Supplement reprinted an article from the Boston
Evening Post which stated, in part: "It is a natural right which the people have reserved to
themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defense ...
"Boston Under Military Rule" N.Y. J. SUPPLEMENT, April 13, 1769, at 79.
181. See, e.g., 1 W. GORDON, THE HISTORY OF THE RISE, PROGRESS AND
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 473 (1770).
182. See, e.g., 1 KATE MASON ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON 181-82
(1892); HEZEKIAH NILES, REPUBLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES AND ACTS OF THE
REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 277-80 (1876).
183. NILES, supra note 182, at 277-80.
184. Richard Henry Lee and George Mason, both Virginia delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, refused to sign the final draft of the Constitution, mainly
because of the lack of a Bill of Rights; both walked out of the Convention to organize an
opposition. See, e.g., HARDY, supra note 172, at 63.
185. Mason authored the Virginia Constitution and Declaration of Rights, and Henry
served as patriot orator and wartime governor of Virginia.
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both leaders of the Anti-Federalists-stressed the role of the militia
and argued that every man had the duty and right to be armed,
pointing to the possibility that the national government may either
unintentionally or deliberately fail to provide for arming the militia.186
Similarly, Anti-Federalist Richard Henry Lee insisted that "[t]o
preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people
always possess arms."'187
Federalists such as Madison and Hamilton were not opposed to a
bill of rights that explicitly recognized the right to keep and bear arms
because of any opposition to this individual right; rather, they
opposed a Bill of Rights as unnecessary and dangerous.188 According
to Madison and Hamilton, the Constitution created a federal
government of limited delegated powers, and a bill of rights would
imply that the federal government possessed certain implied powers
not explicitly in the Constitution.189 Madison, for example, saw the
right of the people to bear arms as being one of the advantages
"Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation,"
which protects the people from misuse of standing armies.19°
Next, the Duncan Court looked to the writings of Blackstone to
aid its inquiry as to whether the right in question was "fundamental."
Blackstone wrote that the Bill of Rights signified that subjects were
entitled to justice in the court, to petition the king, "and, lastly, to the
right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defense."' 91
Similarly, should the Court decide to focus their inquiry on
1868-the year of passage of the Fourteenth Amendment (as I
suggested in supra Part IIIB)-there is "ample evidence that the right
to keep and bear arms was regarded as equally 'fundamental' by
those who framed the Fourteenth Amendment (and by the
186. See DAVID ROBERTSON, DEBATES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA 270,274 (2d ed. 1805).
187. RICHARD HENRY LEE, ADDITIONAL LETrERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER
170 (1788).
188. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 321-28 (James Madison), reprinted in THE
FEDERALIST bk. 1 (Tudor Publishing Co. 1937); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 152-63
(Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST bk. 2 (Tudor Publishing Co. 1937).
189. See id.
190. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 188, at 327 (addressing
critics' (of the proposed constitution) claims that one major failure of the proposed
constitution was the absence of a prohibition on the national government regarding
standing armies). Madison argued that the American "advantage of being armed"
ensured against misuse, and made such protection unnecessary. Id.
191. BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at 144 ("The fifth and last auxiliary right of the
subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defense, suitable to
their condition and degree and such as are allowed by law... [and] the natural right of
resistance and self-preservation").
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Amendment's intended beneficiaries, the freedmen)."'192 Brannon
Denning wrote:
The right to keep and bear arms free from state interference was
one of particular interest to freed blacks following the end of the
Civil War [during antebellum conventions, many Southern states
amended their constitutions to restrict the right to arms to free
white menI93]. During the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment,
many Congressmen explicitly mentioned the right to keep and bear
arms as one of the "privileges and immunities" of citizenship the
Amendment was intended to protect. 194
Likewise, Professor Eric Foner, a leading historian of
Reconstruction, wrote, "[i]t is abundantly clear that Republicans
wished to give constitutional sanction to states' obligation to respect
such key provisions as freedom of speech, the right to bear arms, trial
by impartial jury, and protection against cruel and unusual
punishment and unreasonable search and seizure."' 95
(2) The Right To Keep and Bear Arms in State Constitutions
The Court in Duncan considered whether the constitutions of the
original states protected the right in question. Between 1776 and
1783, four states adopted bills of rights explicitly recognizing "the
right of the people to bear arms," four other states adopted "well
regulated militia" guarantees which mandated an armed populace,
and the remaining six chose not to expressly enumerate any rights of
the people.196
The Virginia constitution, for example, included:
A declaration of rights made by the representatives of the good
192. Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment as an "Underenforced
Constitutional Norm," 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 719, 756 (1998) (citing AKIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998)) ("[flor this
theory of a 'reconstructed' Second Amendment, I owe debt of gratitude to the work of
Professor Amar whose take on the changes the Fourteenth Amendment wrought on not
only the Second Amendment, but on the whole Bill of Rights as well, as part of a
forthcoming work... ").
193. See CRAMER E. CLAYTON, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE:
THE ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND
BEAR ARMS 97 (1994); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Under
the Tennessee Constitution: A Case Study in Civic Republican Thought, 61 TENN. L. REV.
647, 659-660 (discussing changes to the Tennessee Constitution).
194. Denning, supra note 192, at 756-57 (citing AMAR, supra note 192); see generally
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986).
195. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REvOLUTION 1863-
1877 at 258 (1988).
196. See PA. DEC. OF RIGHTS, Art. XIII (1776) (the people have a right to bear arms
for the defense of themselves and the state"); VA. DEC. OF RIGHTS, Art. XIII (1776) (the
right of "the body of the people, [to be] trained to Arms"); DEL. DEC. OF RIGHTS, Art.
XVIII (1776); MD. DEC. OF RIGHTS, Art. XXV (1776).
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people of Virginia, assembled in full and free convention; which
rights do pertain to them and their posterity, as the basis and
foundation of government.
That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people
trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free
state; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be avoided as
dangerous to liberty and that in all cases the military should be
under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power.197
Likewise, the Pennsylvania Declaration provided the citizens of
Pennsylvania with a broad right to bear arms:
A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the State of
Pennsylvania
That the people have the right to bear arms for the defense of
themselves and the state; and as standing armies in the time of
peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; And
that the military should be kept under strict subordination to, and
governed by, the civil power.198
The Massachusetts 1780 bill of rights, drafted by John Adams,
went even further:
A Declaration of Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts
The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common
defense. And as, in time of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty,
they ought not to be maintained without the consent of the
legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact
subordination to the civil authority and be governed by it.199
The national government's equivalent, enacted in 1789,200 must
be interpreted in light of the universally known state declarations of
the right to arms. One such interpretation views the amendment to
the Federal Constitution as a political compromise intended to satisfy
the demands of both the militia and the individual right to bear arms
197. VA. CONST. § 15. See also BENJAMIN P. POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONsTITUTION, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAw (1877); JOHN R.
BIGELOw, THE AMERIcAN'S OWN BOOK: OR, THE CONSTIUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL
STATES IN THE UNION (1848). Note that for the Virginia Constitution, Thomas Jefferson
proposed that "[n]o freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms." 1 PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON at 344. The actual words of the Virginia Constitution, adopted by
the legislature, were written by George Mason.
198. PA. CONST. ART. XIII
199. MASS. CONST. ART. XVII. See also North Carolina's 1776 Bill of Rights:
That the people have a right to bear arms, for the defense of the State; and as
standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be
kept up; and that the military should be under strict subordination to, and
governed by, the civil power. N.C. CONST. ART. XVII.
200. The form of the amendment adopted by the Senate and approved by both houses
on September 25, 1789 became the Second Amendment of the Bill of Rights.
HALBROOK, supra note 141, at 81.
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schools of thought (discussed supra Part IA4). Nevertheless, the
evidence on this particular inquiry is not as conclusive as that of the
right to jury trial, where the Duncan court found that all of the
original states constitutionally guaranteed the right. It is unclear what
significance the Court would attribute to the absence, in six states
between 1776-1783, of any express enumeration of the rights of the
people to keep and bear arms.
(3) Popular Regard for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
The Court, in Duncan, also emphasized that the right to "[j]ury
trial continues to receive strong support. '2 01 At the time Duncan was
decided, every state guaranteed a right to jury trial in serious criminal
cases, and there were no "significant movements underway" to
dispense with the right.20 Here, one should pause to note another
flaw in the Court's incorporation doctrine, namely the Court's inquiry
into the status quo in light of the fact that the Constitution is
supposed to be an anti-majoritarian doctrine. Nevertheless, public
support for the Second Amendment may not be as strong as the
universal endorsement of the right to a jury trial.203 For example,
many members of academia view the Second Amendment as trivial,
certainly not as important as the First Amendment right to free
speech.204 However, over the last few years, many states have
expressed their support of the right to keep and bear arms through
the adoption of "right to carry" laws. As of 1996, 31 states allow law-
abiding citizens to carry a concealed handgun for personal
protection.205 Right to carry laws require eligible persons be granted
a permit to carry a handgun after passing a background check and
sometimes a firearms safety class.2°6 If an applicant is rejected, "the
burden of proof is on the non-issuing sheriff, police chief, or judge to
show that an applicant is either unqualified or a danger to public
safety." 207
On the other hand, one can argue that America is a dramatically
different place than it was in the early colonial times, or even when
compared to the early days of our nation. America is not the same
201. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968).
202. Id
203. For public opinion polls on gun control, see GARY KLECK, TARGETING GuNs:
FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 345-49 (1997).
204. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 18, at 639-40.
205. David Kopel, The Untold Triumph of Concealed-Carry Permits, July-August 1996
POL. REv. 9-11.
206. The exception is Vermont, which does not require a permit at all to carry a
concealed firearm.
207. Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, "Shall Issue": The New Wave of Concealed
Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 680 (1995).
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dangerous uncivilized land filled with threats from wild animals, as
well as Indians, French, Dutch, and Spaniards. However, today's
threats are equally as menacing, if not more so, and include
murderers, thieves, rapists, gang members and others who commit
random acts of violence against citizens. After all, it is "fundamental
American law" that the police do not have a legal responsibility to
provide personal protection to individuals.208 Even if the rationale for
the right to keep and bear arms has changed, the situation is still
analogous to that in Duncan since the rationale for a right to a jury
trial in criminal cases has changed. No longer does the jury trial
provide the only procedural safeguard to criminal defendants.
Additional procedural safeguards have since been enacted; most
significantly, the right to counsel. And yet the Court did not allow
this shift in the rationale underlying the right to prevent its finding
that the right is "fundamental to the [Anglo-] American scheme of
justice." 209
(4) The Purpose of the Second Amendment
Lastly, in concluding that "[t]he deep commitment of the Nation
to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against
arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection under the Due
Process Clause... and must therefore be respected by the states," 210
the Duncan Court considered the purposes served by the right:
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to
prevent oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our
constitutions knew from history and experience that it was
necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to
eliminate enemies against judges too responsive to the voice of
higher authority. The framers of the constitutions strove to create
an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection
against arbitrary action. 2
The Court could make a similar conclusion with regard to the
208. Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C. 1981). See also Bowers v.
DeVito, 686 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that there are no federal constitutional
requirements that state or local agencies provide sufficient police protection); Calogrides
v. City of Mobile, 475 So. 2d 560 (Ala. 1985); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d
1306 (D.C. 1983); Davidson v. City of Westminister, 659 P.2d 894 (Cal. 1982); Sapp v. City
of Tallahassee, 348 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1977); Keane v. City of Chicago, 240
N.E.2d 321 (Ill. App.Ct. 1968); Simpson's Food Fair v. Evansville, 272 N.E.2d. 871 (Ind.
App. 1971); Silver v. City of Minneapolis, 170 N.W.2d. 206 (Minn. 1969); Wuetrich v.
Delia, 382 A.2d. 929, 930 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); Riss v. City of New York, 240
N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1958); Chapman v. City of Philadelphia, 434 A.2d 753 (Pa. Super. Co.
1981); Morris v. Musser, 478 A.2d 937 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
209. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
210. Id. at 156.
211. I& at 155-56.
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Second Amendment. The purpose of the Second Amendment is
twofold:
The Second Amendment was meant to accomplish two distinct
goals, each perceived as crucial to the maintenance of liberty. First,
it was meant to guarantee the individual's right to have arms for
self-defense and self-preservation. Such an individual right was a
legacy of the English Bill of Rights. This is also plain from
American colonial practice, the debates over the Constitution, and
state proposals for what was to become the Second Amendment. 212
The second and related objective concerned the militia. The
coupling of these two objectives has caused great confusion. The
customary American militia necessitated an armed public. Both
Madison's original version of the amendment and those versions
suggested by the states described the militia as either "composed of"
or "including" the body of the people.213 A select militia was
regarded as little better than a standing army.
In other words, the right to keep and bear arms was considered
essential for protection at home and against government tyranny.
The Framers divided power to protect citizens' liberty not only by
creating three branches within the federal government and splitting
power between the federal and state governments, but also by
ensuring that the citizenry possessed sufficient military power to
offset the military power of the federal government. Justice Story
wrote:
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been
considered as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it
offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary
power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in
the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over
them.214
Despite criminological research which concludes that allowing
mentally sane, law abiding adults to "keep and bear arms" deters
crime, thus reducing the number of violent crimes and thefts in
America, 215 there are those, such as Dennis Henigan, who argue that
212. Joyce Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American
Right, 162 (1994) (citing the proposals of Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and
Rhode Island, in Documentary History of the Constitution 2:380 at 191,269,314).
213. 11 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 297 (R. Rutland & C. Hobson eds. 1977).
214. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1890 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 1891).
215. See, e.g., Kopel, supra note 205, at 10. The University of Chicago conducted a
comprehensive study which examined crime data for 3,054 counties and found that while
concealed-carry reform had little effect in rural counties, in urban counties reform was
followed by a substantial reduction in homicide and other violent crimes such as robbery.
The researchers "estimated that if all states that did not have concealed carry laws in 1992
adopted such laws, there would be approximately 1,800 fewer murders and 3,000 fewer
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an individual right's reading of the amendment "represents a
profoundly dangerous doctrine of unrestrained individual rights
which, if adopted by the courts, would threaten the rule of law
itself. '216 The Duncan Court, however, noted that the jury trial has
"its weaknesses and the potential for misuse," but the Court did not
allow this to prevent it from incorporating the right.217 If the majority
of people perceive that a particular constitutional provision is bad
public policy, then perhaps that provision should be amended. The
Constitution is, however, the supreme law of the land and needs to
either be enforced or amended, but not ignored.
IV. A Glance at What the Right Might Look Like
Justice Thomas, in his concurrence in Printz v. United States218
(quoted in the introduction to this Note), assumed that the Second
Amendment would immunize whole areas from federal government
regulation: "[t]he Constitution, in addition to delegating certain
enumerated powers to Congress, places whole areas outside the reach
of Congress' regulatory authority. '219 A majority of the Court,
however, has never interpreted any of the individual rights as
imposing absolute prohibitions against government action.
This Note argues that should the Court determine that the
Second Amendment provides an individual right, the amendment
would not provide an absolute "right to keep and bear arms."
Rather, as many have stated, including Boston University Law
Professor Randy E. Barnett and San Francisco attorney Don Kates,
the broad individual right view sees the Second Amendment as a
right of the people to be treated the same as other rights of the people
in the Constitution, that is, subject to reasonable regulation consistent
with the amendment's purpose.220 Thus, to the extent that Justice
Thomas' statement that "whole areas" are outside Congressional
reach is interpreted as justification for reading the Second
Amendment as an absolute right, that interpretation is inconsistent
with how the rest of the Constitution has been read. Having decided
that the Second Amendment does not provide an absolute right, one
question remains: what sort of restrictions should be allowed?
rapes annually." IkL; see also Gary Kleck & E. Brett Patterson, The Impact of Gun
Control and Gun Ownership Levels on Violence Rates, 9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIME 249
(1993).
216. Henigan, supra note 20, at 110.
217. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156-57.
218. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
219. Id. at 2386 (1997).
220. Randy Barnett & Don Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORY LJ. 1139, 1142 (1996).
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A. Two Possible Tests
Judicial review under the Second Amendment should address at
least two separate issues: (1) who is protected by the Second
Amendment; and (2) the level of scrutiny applicable to legislation
limiting the "right to keep and bear arms."
Regarding the first issue, any legislation restricting the rights of
felons, minors, or mentally retarded persons to keep or bear arms
should be subject to rational basis scrutiny in light of the fact that the
Court has refused to treat any of these classifications as suspect or
even quasi-suspect.2 21 Furthermore, with respect to felons, the Court
has repeatedly recognized that a legislature may constitutionally deny
convicted felons fundamental rights. 2m
In order to address the second issue, it is important to consider
both the two-fold purpose of the Second Amendment-protection of
self and protection against government tyranny (discussed supra Part
IIIC4)-and the amendment's "shall not be infringed" language.
Although the Court has not interpreted any of the individual rights as
imposing absolute prohibitions against government action, the
wording of the amendments and the varying levels of protection
remain relevant in determining what type of restrictions should be
permitted. "The kind of protection that particular rights enshrined in
the Bill of Rights receive is not identical. Some are guaranteed in the
most absolute and imperative terms."m For example, the First
Amendment specifies that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. 2 24 In contrast, the Fourth Amendment
proscribes only "unreasonable" searches and seizures.225
Although one possibility includes treating the Second
Amendment like the free speech clause of the First Amendment,22 6
221. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,442 (1985).
222. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66 (1980).
223. W. Rumble, James Madison on the Value of Bills of Rights, CONS=TUTIONALISM
122,137 (Pennock and Chapman eds., 1979).
224. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
225. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
226. There are a number of First Amendment doctrines, including the "prior restraint
test," the "Brandenburg test," and the overbreadth doctrine. See e.g., Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 719 (1931) (holding that under the doctrine of prior restraints, any
governmental action that prevents expression from occurring, as distinguished from
punishment once it had occurred, is presumptively invalid as a violation of the First
Amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that under the
Brandenburg test, legislation which proscribes speech is unconstitutional unless it is
directed to inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (under the overbreadth doctrine, the
government may not achieve its concededly valid purpose by legislation that has an
unnecessarily broad reach, that is, punishes protected speech or conduct in its effort to
regulate otherwise unprotected expression).
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the Second Amendment's mandate "shall not be infringed" 227 is
arguably a higher standard of protection than the free speech clause's
"abridg[e] the freedom of speech." 228  On the other hand, the
language of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment-
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"-is more directly analogous
to the Second Amendment's "shall not be infringed" prohibition.
The text of these two provisions guarantee against any interference
whatsoever, suggesting that a version of the free exercise clause's test
would serve as a better match than any of the tests in the free speech
context.
I propose that the Court adopt one of the following tests: (1) a
hybrid test, combining the first prong of the three-part test from
Lemon v. Kurtzman22 9 with the second prong from the free speech
jurisprudence,230 modified somewhat to further the purposes of the
Second Amendment-defense of self and family and protection
against government tyranny; or (2) a version of the "undue burden"
test from Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 231 The first test would
partially treat the Second Amendment like the free exercise clause by
considering the similarity in the language, while modifying the test to
take into account the unique purposes of the Second Amendment.
Admittedly, the language of the Second Amendment is not
particularly similar to the language of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which the Roe and Casey Courts relied on, but the Court did not
derive the "undue burden" test from the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Adopting the "undue burden" test from Casey could
227. U.S. CONST. amend. 11 (emphasis added).
228. U.S. CONST. amend I (emphasis added). The full text of the First Amendment
reads as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assembly, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
AL; see also Donald W. Dowd, The Relevance of the Second Amendment to Gun Control
Legislation, 58 MONT. L. REV. 79,109 (1997) (arguing that applying the First Amendment
"prior restraint test" to the Second Amendment would most likely fail because "the values
that would be protected under the Second Amendment have little to do with those that
gave rise to the prior restraint standard under the First Amendment; the fear of 'chilling
effects' of prior retrains on the exercising of First Amendment rights is hardly applicable
to the Second Amendment").
229. 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1970) (holding that under the Court's three-fold test,
government action is valid only if it satisfies each of the following conditions: (1) it must
have a "secular legislative purpose"; (2) "its principal or primary effect must neither
advance nor inhibit religion"; and (3) "it must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion").
230. See, e.g., Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
231. 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
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serve as a meaningful Second Amendment test by focusing the
inquiry on the liberty the Founders intended to protect through the
Second Amendment. Like the Casey test, a Second Amendment
undue burden test should take into account the purpose and meaning
of the right at stake.232
(1) The Hybrid Test
Under the hybrid test, in order to determine whether
government action violates the Second Amendment, courts should
scrutinize whether the legislation serves: (1) a legitimate purpose not
inconsistent with the purposes behind the Second Amendment; and
(2) whether the means are narrowly tailored to meet the legitimate
purpose.
(2) The "Undue Burden" Test
A second option is for the Court to adopt a version of the Casey
"undue burden" test. Under this test, an undue burden exists, and
therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to
place a substantial obstacle in the path of an individual seeking to
exercise his or her Second Amendment right.233 Thus, the inquiry
focuses on whether a regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of an individual seeking to protect him
or herself against others and against government tyranny.
Under either of these tests, the author does not suggest that the
"right to keep and bear arms" would encompass field artillery, tanks,
fighter jets, or bombers. First, the text of the Second Amendment
contains limitations such as "the right to keep and bear arms."
Individuals are hardly capable of bearing a tank or bomber. Second,
the Second Amendment does not guarantee parity of force. Rather,
"the right of the people to keep and bear arms" serves to reduce the
chance that the government will become tyrannical by eliminating the
government's monopoly on the use of force. The presence of an
armed populace significantly raises the costs of a coup d'etat23 4 In
other words, the Second Amendment does not guarantee equality of
232. The right at stake in Casey was a woman's right to have an abortion.
233. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874. The Casey Court also stated that "[a] finding of an
undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus." Id. at 877.
234. See Daniel D. Polsby & Don. B. Kates, Jr., Of Holocausts and Gun Control, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 1237 (1997) (arguing that "a connection exists between the restrictiveness
of a country's civilian weapons policy and its ability to commit genocide upon its own
people"). The authors discuss the cases of Uganda and Indonesia to "show that the
alternative to genocide may be civil war if a genocide target is sufficiently well-armed to
fight back." Id.
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power, but rather that the government will not have a monopoly on
the instruments of force.
B. Application of the Tests to Two California Gun Control Statutes
Under either of the author's two proposed tests, judicial
enforcement of the Second Amendment would not prohibit any or all
gun control legislation. The following two examples illustrate this
point:
(1) California Penal Code Section 171(b)
Section 171(b) of the California Penal Code is an example of a
statute that would withstand constitutional scrutiny under both of the
tests articulated in Part IVA. Section 171(b) prohibits, in part,
bringing or possessing any firearm, designated deadly weapons, stun
guns, or fixable blade knives with four inch or longer blades within
any courthouse or building designated as a courthouse, except when
used as evidence, possessed by peace officers, or other designated
persons.2 35 First, the statute serves a legitimate purpose not
inconsistent with the purposes of the Second Amendment. The
purpose of section 171(b) includes the protection of judges, attorneys,
litigants, witnesses, and other persons present in courts of law and
state or local government buildings. Second, the statute is narrowly
tailored to meet that purpose because section 171(b) includes
numerous exceptions for:
(1) A person who possesses weapons in, or transports weapons
into, a court of law to be used as evidence.
(2) (A) A duly appointed peace officer... a retired peace officer
with authorization to carry concealed weapons ... a full-time paid
peace officer of another state or the federal government who is
carrying out official duties while in California, or any person
summoned by any of these officers to assist in making arrests or
preserving the peace while he or she is actually engaged in assisting
the officer ....
(5) A person who lawfully resides in, lawfully owns, or is in lawful
possession of, that building with respect to those portions of the
building that are not owned or leased by the state or local
government.2 36
Thus, the inclusion of such exceptions serves to limit the application
of section 171(b) to accomplish its purpose with sufficient precision.
Likewise, under the "undue burden" test, section 171(b) would
be upheld. As the Casey Court stated, "[t]he fact that a law which
serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself,
235. CAL. PENAL CODE § 171(b) (1997).
236. 1&
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has the incidental effect [of restricting an individual's right] cannot be
enough to invalidate it." 237 Only legislation that imposes an undue
burden on the right to keep and bear arms would be unconstitutional.
Here, limiting the possession of all weapons, including firearms,238 in
state or local public buildings such as courthouses is not
unreasonable, and does not impose an undue burden because
individuals are still free to exercise their Second Amendment right
with the limited exception of inside public buildings.
(2) The Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989
The Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989 consists
of a list of banned guns and a mechanism by which the judiciary is
allowed to add guns to the list.239  The guns on the list are
semiautomatic firearms.240 In March of 1998, the California Court of
Appeal, in Kasler v. Lungren, held that a provision of the act that
permitted the judiciary to add to an existing list of banned guns was
unconstitutional, finding that the add-on provision violated the
separation of powers doctrine, the Due Process Clause (deprived
citizens of notice of law), and the Equal Protection Clause, and was
also vague. 241
Under the author's proposed two-prong test, the entire Assault
Weapons Control Act is unconstitutional. Under the first prong of
the author's first proposed test-whether the legislation serves a
purpose not inconsistent with the purposes of the Second
Amendment-the act would fails to withstand constitutional scrutiny
because the stated legislative purpose is pretextual. The stated
purpose of the act is to place restrictions on the use of "assault
237. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
238. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 171(b).
239. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12275-12290 (1997).
240. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12276 (1997). As semiautomatic firearm is described as:
The semi in semiautomatic comes from the fact that the energy created by the
[firing] of gunpowder, used to force the bullet down the barrel, is diverted away
from the shooter. The energy is directed forward, and is used to reload the next
cartridge into the firing chamber. Thus, in semiautomatic action firearms the
shooter does not need to perform an additional step, such as cocking a lever
("lever action") or operating a slide ("slide action"), in order to load the next
round. Although a semiautomatic firearm does not require a separate step to
load the next round into the firing chamber, the semiautomatic is not unique in
this regard. In a revolver or a double-barreled shotgun or rifle, the shooter can
also fire the next shot as fast as he can squeeze the trigger.
David B. Kopel, Rational Basis Analysis of "Assault Weapon" Prohibition, 20 J.
CONTEMP. L. 381,388-89 (1994).
241. Kasler v. Lungren, _ P.2d _, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 260, 273-74 (1998) (holding further
that although the add-on provision was unconstitutional, it was possible to sever it from
the remainder of the act), review granted, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824 (Cal. May 20,1998).
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weapons" which the legislature determined to "pose a significant
threat to the health, safety, and security of the citizens of
California." 242 The legislature based this on their findings that an
"assault weapon" has "such a high rate of fire and capacity for
firepower that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational
firearm is substantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used
to kill and injure human beings." 243 First, at the time the act was
enacted "assault weapons" were used in only about one percent of all
gun crime in California.244 According to a report prepared by the
California Department of Justice, and based on data from police
firearm laboratories throughout the state, in 1990, "assault weapons"
comprised 36 of the 963 firearms involved in homicide or aggravated
assault.245 The report concluded that "assault weapons play a very
small role in assault and homicide firearm cases. '246 "[T]he report,
prepared in response to a request by a California State Senator, was
suppressed by the California Attorney General's Office, which
claimed that the report did not exist. A leaked copy was released to
the media."247 Second, the legislative findings are wrong--"'assault
weapons' do not fire faster and do not have greater ammunition
capacity than many other firearms." 248  Rather, so-called "assault
242. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12275.5 (1997) (entitled "Legislative findings and
declarations").
243. Id
244. David Alan Coia, Assault Rifles Said to Play a Small Role in Violent Crimes,
WASH. TIMES, June 27,1992, at A4.
245. Id.
246. Id. See also David Freed, Assault Rifles are Not Heavily Used in Crimes, L.A.
TIMES, MAY 20, 1992, at A18 (noting that fifty-eight of the 1,979 guns seized from
California narcotics dealers in 1990 were "assault weapons").
247. Kopel, supra note 241, at 407.
248. Id. at 404. New York University School of Law Professor David Kopel wrote:
If "assault weapons" were actually automatic firearms, such as machine guns,
then the claim [that they have a high rate of fire] would clearly be true. With an
automatic weapon, if the shooter squeezes and holds the trigger, bullets will fire
automatically and rapidly until the trigger is released.
Semiautomatic firearms are... not automatic. With a semiautomatic, pressing
the trigger fires one, and only one bullet. To fire another bullet, the shooter must
release the trigger, and then press it again. Thus, a semiautomatic can shoot only
as fast as a person can squeeze the trigger.
Id. at 388 (citations omitted).
A second feature, supposedly unique to 'assault weapons,' is their high
ammunition capacity. In fact, most semiautomatic firearms, both banned and
nonbanned, store their ammunition in detachable boxes or tubes called
'magazines.' The number of rounds a gun can fire without reloading depends on
the size of the magazine, an interchangeable, removable part that can be
purchased separately. Thus, ammunition capacity has nothing to do with the gun
itself. The magazine, not the gun, is the variable. Any gun that accepts
detachable magazines can accept a magazine of any size.
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weapons" were banned by the California Legislature for political
reasons-because they are military-looking-not because they are
any different from other civilian semi-automatics. There is no logical
reason why the legislature placed some military-looking civilian semi-
automatics on the banned list while others were not. They are all
very similar in function and purpose.
Moreover, the provision also fails the second prong because it is
not narrowly tailored. The provision is under-inclusive because the
act omits from the list of "assault weapons" certain weapons which
were functionally indistinguishable from guns on the list, as well as
certain weapons that were identical to guns on the list.249 An example
noted by the Kasler court is:
the Heckler and Kock PSG-1 sniper rifle (listed) fires the standard
NATO 7.62 millimeter cartridge (".308 Winchester") and uses a
five-round magazine.., the Communist-bloc Dragunov SVD
sniper rifle (not listed) fires "the Russian 7.62 x 54 high power
military cartridge" or "the old military 7.92x57 mm., though it may
also be, or have been available in .308 Winchester."5 0
Likewise, the "add-on" provision, by which the Legislature attempted
to account for this problem, is also under-inclusive because it is
limited in scope and could not be used to add all possible weapons
with equal or greater rates of fire and capacity for firepower.
Under the "undue burden" test, the act would also be held
unconstitutional as a regulation that has the effect (and very likely the
purpose) of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of individuals
seeking to exercise their Second Amendment right. The individual's
interest at stake here is the exercise of a constitutional right. The
state, on the other hand, has no legitimate interest in banning all
weapons deemed "assault weapons" when the classification is not
based on differences that are real in fact.
Conclusion
As Justice Thomas suggested during the last week of the Court's
1997 term, the time has come for the United States Supreme Court to
enter the current debate to "determine whether Justice Story was
correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms 'has justly been
considered, as the palladium of the liberties of the republic."'5 1
Likewise, Law Professor Nelson Lund observed: "[i]n the years since
Id at 390-91 (citations omitted).
249. See Kasler v. Lungren, - P.2d -, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 260, 273-74 (1998), review
granted, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824 (Cal. May 20,1998).
250. I
251. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. _, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2386 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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the incorporation process began, the Supreme Court has refused,
without explanation, to address the issue of Second Amendment
incorporation. In this respect, the Second Amendment is unique."2 52
The Court has a responsibility to address questions concerning the
nature, scope, and applicability of the rights expressly provided by the
Bill of Rights. There is no adequate justification for treating the
Second Amendment differently than the rest of the Bill of Rights.
Should the Court conclude, consistent with a textual and
historical reading of the amendment, that the amendment was
intended to provide both a collective and an individual right, the next
logical step is for the Court to determine the applicability of the right,
namely, whether the amendment applies to state, as well as federal,
action.253 This Note has laid out the Court's current incorporation
doctrine and applied it to the Second Amendment. The Author's
preference is for the Court to revise completely its current
incorporation doctrine, the flaws of which include: the Court's failure
to identify when the "fundamental right" inquiry is to be made, the
Court's interchangeable use of "American scheme of liberty" and
"Anglo-American scheme of justice," and the Court's status quo
inquiry when interpreting an anti-majoritarian document. Since,
however, the Court has made no attempt either to change or to
abandon the current doctrine, the Second Amendment must be
considered within the existing framework. Under this analysis, there
exists a strong case for incorporating the Second Amendment against
state action.
The last section of this Note sets forth the author's two proposed
tests: (1) a two-prong hybrid test, and (2) an "undue burden" test.
The author's tests, as illustrated by their application to California
Penal Code section 171(b), demonstrate that a judicially-enforced
Second Amendment would not be "fatal in fact" to all gun control
legislation.
252. Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual's Right to Arms, 31 GA. L.
REV. 1, 49 (1996).
253. Interpretation of the scope of the amendment also includes determining which
weapons qualify as "arms." As noted previously, the Court has incorporated rights
without fully defining the scope or nature of the right. See note 17, supra. In Duncan v.
Louisiana, for example, the Court concluded that it need not articulate an exact line that
determines whether the seriousness of the punishment is enough to require a jury trial.
391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968). Likewise, in order to incorporate the Second Amendment, the
Court need not fully define the scope or nature of the right.
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